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We examine the productivity of informal firms (those that are not registered with the government)
in 24 African countries using field work and World Bank firm level data.  We find that productivity
jumps sharply if we compare small formal firms to informal firms, and rises rapidly with the size of
formal firms. Critically, informal firms appear to be qualitatively different than formal firms: they
are smaller in size, produce to order, are run by managers with low human capital, do not have access
to external finance, do not advertise their products, and sell to largely informal clients for cash. Informal
firms thus occupy a very different market niche than formal firms do, and rarely become formal because
















I.  Introduction.  
Informal economic activity is pervasive in developing countries.  It includes both output produced 
by firms that are not registered with the government, and output by registered firms that is sold for cash 
and is not reported to the government.  Unregistered firms might be entirely unknown to the government, 
or might be registered with some authorities (such as municipalities) and not others (such as tax).   
Employees of informal firms rarely have formal employment contracts, or pay taxes.  Altogether, 
unofficial output often accounts for half or more of the total in a developing country.  Informality declines 
sharply as countries grow.  
The prevalence of informality in poor countries raises a number of important questions for 
economic development.  Are informal firms just like formal firms, except that they fail to register because 
of the ominous tax and regulatory burdens?  Are they as productive as formal firms?  Do they sell the 
same kinds of output?  Should informality be fought because it provides unfair competition for formal 
firms, as Farrell (2004) expressing the views of the McKinsey Global Institute has argued, or encouraged 
because it creates employment where there would be none otherwise?  What are the basic characteristics 
of informal firms? 
In an earlier article (La Porta and Shleifer 2008), we have presented evidence that informal firms 
are qualitatively different from formal firms.  In particular, they are much smaller and much less 
productive.  Their managers have much less human capital than do managers of formal firms.  They sell 
to very different customers, who are predominantly themselves informal.  They do not advertise, have less 
capital, and rely to a smaller extent on public goods such as police protection.  Very few of the formal 
firms have been previously informal, inconsistent with the view that formality is a later stage of a firm’s 
life cycle, as its business grows.   
In our earlier paper, we referred to this as the dual theory of informality, inspired by the ideas of 
dual economy and the big push in development economics (e.g., Harris and Todaro 1970, Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989).   According to these models, the source of economic growth and 
transformation to modernity is the creation of large formal firms, often taking advantage of increasing 
returns technologies.   Informal firms operate in the so-called dual economy, providing subsistence to 
their owners and employees, but not being productive enough to become a source of economic progress.  
Our research points to an intimate connection between duality and informality.   
In this paper, we seek to extend and deepen this analysis, with a particular emphasis on African 
countries.  There are three reasons for doing so.  First, Africa is one of the poorest regions in the world, 
and informality is the dominant form of economic activity.  Moreover, informality in Africa, as in other 2 
 
very poor countries, may take more dramatic forms than in middle income countries such as Brazil, where 
it largely consists of tax evasion in cash transactions.  Second, since we wrote our paper, the World Bank 
has made available a great deal of new data from its Enterprise Surveys, including for African countries, 
so we can significantly expand the analysis.  Third, we have had the opportunity to make research trips to 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and Kenya, and to visit a modest number of formal and informal firms to make 
comparisons.  Our particular focus was on furniture makers, although we visited several other types of 
business.  The idea was to gain a more subtle understanding of the working of the informal economy, and 
in particular to put more meat on the statistical bones of Enterprise Surveys.  
The results we obtain from this investigation confirm many of our earlier findings, but add a new 
and potentially crucial element to the story.  Specifically, the strong impression we obtained from country 
visits is a substantial difference in the quality of goods sold by informal and formal firms.  The lower 
product quality of informal firms might be the unifying factor of the dual theory: it explains how smaller 
size, production to order rather than mass production, lower human capital of the managers, lower use of 
capital, the absence of advertising, and sales to largely informal  retail clients for cash all go together.  
Informal firms can only supply low quality inexpensive goods, but fortunately their customers demand 
low quality inexpensive goods.  Informal firms thus occupy a very different market niche than formal 
firms do, and rarely become formal precisely because there is very little demand for their products from 
the formal sector.  Quality segments the economy.  This idea of quality segmentation of markets is known 
international trade as the Linder effect, according to which poor countries trade with other poor countries 
rather than with the rich ones (see Murphy and Shleifer 1997 for a model), but as far as we know the 
relevance of this phenomenon to informality and development has not been emphasized.   
  In the next section of the paper, we briefly review some observations from our visits to formal 
and informal firms in Madagascar, Mauritius, and Kenya.  In Section 3, we describe the main data we use 
in the paper and present some information on the characteristics of formal and informal firms.  Section 4 
presents the main results on the productivity of formal and informal firms.  Section 5 focuses on obstacles 
do doing business. Section 6 concludes. 
  
II.  Country visits. 
As part of this project, we conducted three country visits.  La Porta went to Madagascar and 
Mauritius in October 2008, while Shleifer went to Kenya in March 2009.  La Porta stayed in capital cities; 
Shleifer went to Busia in Western Kenya as well as to Nairobi.  Both visits were conducted in conjunction 
with World Bank’s implementation of its Enterprise Surveys.  In all three countries, we have visited a 3 
 
substantial number of both formal and informal firms, largely to discuss business with their owners rather 
than collect statistical data.  We have visited businesses in several lines of activity, including 
metalworking, retail, garment manufacturing, shoe manufacturing, and food service, but our particular 
interest was in furniture making and retail.  Altogether, we visited about a dozen establishments 
manufacturing and/or retailing furniture in the three countries.  
  There are several reasons to be interested in furniture in a study of informality.  First, furniture is 
a nearly universally demanded good, so one can consider markets for furniture in just about every 
country.  Second, furniture is demanded by the rich and the poor alike, as well as by firms, so it is 
produced and sold both formally and informally.  Third, furniture is typically made of wood, and is 
therefore heavy.  As a consequence, much of the furniture is locally made rather than imported.  We say 
much because, as we discovered, even in poor African countries a growing amount of furniture is 
imported from China and Malaysia; this furniture tends to require assembly rather than being sold as a 
finished product.  Fourth, and perhaps most important, furniture can be of higher and lower quality, and, 
furthermore, the production of higher quality furniture is typically more capital intensive.  A producer 
needs machines to make wood panels that are smooth, polished, and nicely fitting together.  Finally, 
furniture can be and often is produced by relatively small firms.  While there are some increasing returns 
from producing standardized products, furniture is not like bottle or automobile manufacturing, in which 
increasing returns concentrate production in very large firms.   
  We visited both furniture makers and retailers, and tried to find out about manufacturing when the 
initial business we approached was retail.  We used our guides to help us find both formal and informal 
firms.  We were explicitly looking for firms of some size rather than the equivalent of street hawkers. 
Most businesses combine retail and production in the same location, although in a few instances even 
informal retailers had their workshops elsewhere (nearer to where the workers live).  We did not go to any 
very large furniture firms (and we doubt those exist in the countries we visited). 
  To give a sense of the firms we visited, begin with four furniture makers in Madagascar.  The first 
was a small informal store at one end of a street market in a poor neighborhood of Antananarivo, looking 
like an abandoned house.  There were three beds on display, but the dressers, which were the most 
popular item according to the shop keeper, were not available.  Beds for children sold for $50, those for 
adults for $75.  The shop keeper, who seemed idle but reluctant to talk, said the shop was supplied by two 
informal workshops at the outskirts of town.   
  The second furniture maker had a workshop behind a wooden fence in the middle of a slum.  A 
larger establishment, it had 6 permanent workers, all family members, and hired temporary employees 4 
 
when there was demand (at the time of the visit, they had 10).  All production was to order.  The owner 
said that the business was registered, which the translator suggested was consistent with its having an 
industrial electrical connection.  The business operated 4 machines, but manufacturing seemed very 
primitive (wood cut only in straight lines, visible nails in chairs).  At the time of the visit, the workshop 
was working on a 200 piece order for a hotel, and could generally produce 18-20 pieces a week.  
  The third furniture maker was a small workshop with 3 people outside town on the side of the 
main road.  All production, again, was to order, but the owner had a catalog with pictures.  The owner 
first said he was unregistered because he was still learning the business, but then said he was registered.  
The store sold armchairs for $250, beds for $120-$150 in pine and $200-$250 in palissandre, a more 
expensive wood.   
  The most interesting furniture maker in Madagascar was the fourth one, largely because there was 
a line of 50 beds displayed along the street, made in two workshops across the street.  The owner initially 
said that the 7 year old business was unregistered, but then said he was registered because he paid 
“professional tax.”  The workshops looked extremely primitive, but had a couple of simple machines.  
The owner said that a new lathe costs about $1600, but could be assembled from components for $400 
(the cost of 6 beds in the owner’s words), yet he could not find the money to do that.  He also complained 
he could not grow because he lacked capital, but then estimated the value of his inventory at $3300.  He 
said he sells 2-3 beds per week for $170 each, but makes another every time he sells one.  Occasionally 
hotels order 20 beds, but the owner said he could not expand production beyond that.  We could not 
obtain any explanation for the size of the inventory, which was exposed to rain and required security at 
night to be protected.  Our best guess was the lack of human capital by the owner.        
  We also visited Courts, a large retailer of furniture and household appliances from the UK, active 
in former British colonies.  Courts is very big in Mauritius and has two stores in Madagascar.   
Interestingly the cheapest beds at Courts were $120, and of visibly higher quality than the more expensive 
(at least at asking prices) beds of the informal furniture makers described above. 
  The quality of furniture in Mauritius was visibly higher than in Madagascar, presumably because 
Mauritius is a much richer country.  The first maker we saw had a mid-size workshop, with about 10 
employees but no owner present, selling in a store down the street.  The sales were on credit, and the 
business appeared to be formal.   
  The second business we saw in Mauritius was much more substantial.  It was clearly registered, 
with a VAT number prominently displayed at the entrance.  It had 15 employees working on a piece rate 5 
 
basis, and sold 70% to Courts and 30% through its own store.  Courts generally ordered 50-100 pieces 
once every three months, but returned some defective items that the owner then sold in his own store.  
The owner reported that in 2007 the sales of the business were $500,000 and the profits $40,000.  The 
owner nonetheless complained that the business was slow in part because Courts was bringing furniture 
from China and Malaysia, and that he was considering shutting down unless business recovers.   
  The third furniture business in Mauritius was formal as well, and looked the most substantial of 
the three.  The owner started 10 years ago, and now had 16 employees.  There was a car and a truck 
parked outside, as well as other signs of prosperity.  The owner reported that he had a loan from the State-
owned development bank.  He also reported that he registered 2 months ago because he was getting too 
big to avoid getting into trouble with the government.  This owner complained as well that business was 
slow.   
  We visited Courts in Mauritius as well, and learned how it buys furniture.  The manager said that 
the suppliers they found initially were all informal but Courts required them to register to do business.  
They offered the suppliers training (e.g., by sending them to Malaysia), joint design of products, as well 
as 3 month guaranteed orders.  Furniture suppliers ranged from $70,000 to $800,000 per year in annual 
contracts with Courts.  The manager reported growing imports from Malaysia and China, but also said 
that most domestic suppliers could not produce enough volume, as well as deliver with sufficient time 
consistency, to be of interest to Courts.         
  A small informal furniture manufacturer in Busia, in Western Kenya, had all the work done 
outside.  Some wood, and a minimal inventory, were stored in a nearby shed.  All the furniture was made 
to order, after the customer made a down payment for materials. There were no machines (or access to 
electricity), and the furniture looked extremely rough and unpolished, despite being made from beautiful 
hard wood.  All of the 10 workers were informal, the business had no loans, and paid no taxes.   
Nonetheless, the business was registered with the municipal council. 
  In Nairobi, we visited an informal furniture stand on the side of the main road leading to a good 
neighborhood.  There are some finished products exhibited by the roadside, clearly of very rough quality.  
Some assembly work was done in the back of the shop, but the owner said there were also workshops in 
the slum, but not machines.  All workers were casual.  The owner said that he has a license from the 
municipality to allow him to sell at that location, but he was not registered with tax authorities, nor 
compliant with various labor regulations.  6 
 
  We then saw quite a large furniture factory in Nairobi, specializing in making frames for sofas 
and armchairs from wood.  Sometimes the factory upholstered the frames itself, sometimes it sold 
wooden frames to formal upholsterer and retailers, but most of the time, according to the owner, 
individuals just came to pick up the frames and upholstered them on their own.  The sales of the firm 
were obviously substantial: during the half an hour that we were there, several people came and picked up 
frames, all paying cash.  The owner said he had 80-100 employees, all informal.  He said he had been 
there for 15 years, but has just registered last year, largely because his business with formal firms was 
growing, and they demanded invoices.  The factory had several electric machines.  Perhaps most 
interestingly, all production was done outside: there was no building.  There were vast amounts of wood 
chips scattered all over the place, and the owner informed us that another factory a few yards down 
burned down a few months ago.  But he had no fire insurance. 
  A final furniture visit was to a factory next door, which made slightly more complex furniture, 
including bedroom and dining room sets, also had machines, also had nearly all production outside, and 
was not registered.        
  These visits suggest several observations.  First, formality is not an all or nothing state.  Many of 
the firms we visited, in both Madagascar and Kenya, including even street-side sellers, had some kind of a 
municipal license to operate, but employed purely informal employees and were very far from any contact 
with tax authorities.  Tax registration, including incorporation into the VAT collection system, seems like 
the last step of becoming completely formal, delayed for as long as possible.    
  Second, the main reason that firm owners gave for becoming formal in that last sense of being 
able to issue invoices and joining the tax system, was sales to formal firms.  Because of the VAT, formal 
firms such as Courts nearly always demand invoices they use to report their costs, and to issue such 
invoices the seller must be formal itself.  It is this pull from the formal sector that appears to offset, at 
least for some firms, the tax and other costs of becoming formal.  Without this pull, informal firms 
typically maintain extremely low production of low quality goods, and, consistent with the old theories of 
dualism, appear idle most of the time.   Perhaps this idleness stands for something more productive, such 
as guarding the goods, but presumably the owners could be making and guarding at the same time. 
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, our visits to furniture factories and other businesses gave 
us a very strong impression that formal firms produce higher quality output than informal firms do.  
Informality seems to be associated with producing very low quality goods, in small batches, often to 
order, with few or no machines, with no credit, advertising, or other aspects of modern production.  The 
buyers of these goods are typically individual or informal businesses themselves, who transact in cash.  7 
 
Formality, in contrast, is associated with higher quality, larger production volumes, sales to formal firms, 
and greater use of credit and advertising.  As we show in the statistical part of our paper, a crucial 
dividing line separating formal and informal firms might be the human capital of the entrepreneurs.    
Before turning to the statistical part of the paper, we should elaborate what we mean by quality.   
In the case of furniture, quality reflects visible characteristics of the product, such as roughness of the 
wood.  But quality can also refer to whether a product can be trusted in the first place: whether the bottled 
water sold by the peddlers outside the formal store for much lower prices  is actually bottled or filled in 
from the tap, whether watches or bags sold with designer labels are genuine, whether food served in a 
restaurant is fresh, and so on.      
 
III. Characteristics of informal firms. 
  In this section we describe our data and present simple descriptive statistics.  Our basic approach 
is to compare country-by-country the relative performance of formal and informal firms in Africa.  To do 
so, we combine data from three World Bank surveys of individual firms.  The first survey –the Enterprise 
survey—covers formal firms and is available for 123 countries throughout the world.  The other two 
surveys –the Informal and Micro surveys— contain information on both informal and formal firms in a 
few poor countries.  The Informal survey is available for 9 African countries, including Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde (surveyed twice), Egypt, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.  All these 
countries are below the world median income in 2008 (USD 7,558 in PPP terms) and 6 out of 9 are below 
the 25
th percentile (USD 2,194 in PPPP terms).  The Micro survey is available for 20 African countries, 
including Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, and Uganda. With the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, all are below the world median 
income, and 13 out of 20 are below the 25
th percentile.  The concept of informality used in the Informal 
and Micro surveys focuses on registration (as we discuss below, there are several possible kinds of 
registration).  Although questions about tax avoidance are asked, they are indirect.    
Before describing the data in detail, we need to preempt a possible misconception about the 
nature of the firms in our data.  In the context of poor countries, the term informal firm evokes the image 
of street hawkers selling goods out of baskets or of eateries in front of homes.  In fact, such image is a 
good description of how the very poor people make a living (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).  However, the 
informal firms in our sample do not fit that image.  For example, roughly 75% of the observations in the 8 
 
Informal and Micro surveys have –in addition to the entrepreneur-- two employees or more.  The informal 
firms in our sample are likely to be substantially more productive than the own-account workers of 
Banerjee and Duflo.  Indeed, the people who work in them look more like the developing countries’ 
middle class as discussed in Banerjee and Duflo (2008).  
 
III.A Data  
 All three World Bank surveys have a similar structure and differ mainly in the firms that they 
sample.  It is easiest to start by describing the Enterprise Survey--the source for our control group of 
registered or formal firms.  It covers mainly manufacturing and certain services firms with five or more 
employees.  The earliest available data is from 2002 and the latest is from 2009.  The initial step in 
carrying out an Enterprise survey involves contacting the government statistical office of the relevant 
country to request a list of registered establishments.  In some instances, the World Bank supplements the 
government’s list with firms registered with the Chamber of Commerce of the relevant country or listed 
by Dun and Bradstreet or by similar private vendors of business directories.  Thus, although firms in the 
Enterprise Survey may hide some of their output, the central government typically knows of their 
existence.  We refer to these firms as “registered” and define the term below.  The next step involves 
contacting the firms that will be sampled.  Enterprise Surveys use either simple random sampling or 
random stratified sampling.  A local World Bank contractor phones the firms to set up an interview with 
the person who most often deals with banks or government agencies.  At that stage, firms with fewer than 
5 employees are dropped from the sample, as are government-owned establishments, cooperatives, and 
community-owned establishments.  Typical final sample sizes range between 250 and 1,500 businesses 
per country.  The core questionnaire is organized in two parts.  The first part seeks managers’ opinions on 
the business environment.  The second part focuses on productivity measures and is often completed with 
the help of the chief accountant or human resource manager.   
  The World Bank has also conducted separate surveys of informal and small firms to complement 
the Enterprise Survey.  Data on unregistered firms has been collected through the “Informal” 
questionnaire while data on firms with less than 5 employees has been collected through the “Micro” 
questionnaire.  Both surveys share a similar methodology.  In the case of the Informal survey, local World 
Bank contractors identified neighborhoods perceived to have a large number of informal firms.  These 
neighborhoods were then divided into enumeration blocks.  These enumeration blocks were subsequently 
surveyed on foot.  In the case of the Micro survey, local World Bank contractors selected districts and 
zones of each district where, based on national information sources, there was a high concentration of 9 
 
establishments with fewer than five employees.  The contractor then created a comprehensive list of all 
establishments in these zones.  Finally, the contractor selected randomly from that list and went door-to-
door to set up interviews with the top managers of the selected establishments.  Although the Micro 
survey targets establishments with fewer than five employees, larger establishments are not dropped from 
the sample.  In fact, firms with fewer than five employees account for only 62% of the African firms in 
the Micro sample.   
Participation in the surveys is voluntary, and respondents are not paid to participate.  Respondents 
are asked sequentially about the business environment, infrastructure, government relations, employment, 
financing, and firm productivity.  There is some variation in the response rate across questions.  To 
illustrate, out of 8,203 Informal and Micro firms surveyed in our sample, we have: (1) the age of 8,167 
firms, (2) the number of employees of 8,193 firms, (3) the sales of 7,699 firms, (4) the fraction of 
investment financed internally of 7,083 firms, (5) assessments of the fraction of taxes typically evaded by 
firms in their industry of 5,210 respondents, and (6) capacity utilization of 3,259 firms.  Since Informal 
and Micro firms typically do not keep detailed records of their operations, some respondents may simply 
not know the information being asked.  Unfortunately, we have no way of quantifying the biases, if any, 
from missing data.   
Critically, the “Informal” and “Micro” surveys cover registered firms as well as firms that exist 
without the government’s knowledge (i.e., “unregistered” firms).  In the remainder of this paper, we focus 
on informality understood in terms of hidden firms rather than hidden output.  To compare the 
performance of registered and unregistered firms, we need to define what it means to be registered.  The 
questions regarding the legal status of the firm are worded differently in the Informal and Micro 
questionnaires.  In the Informal Survey, we rely on respondent’s answer to whether firms are “registered 
with any agency of the central government".  In practical terms, firms are registered with an agency of the 
central government if they have obtained a tax identification number.  In the Micro Survey, we rely on 
respondent’s answer to whether firms have either “registered with the Office of the Registrar…or other 
government institutions responsible for commercial registration” or have “obtained a tax identification 
number from the tax administration or other agency responsible for tax registration”.
1  Both surveys also 
keep track of whether firms are registered with “any local government agency”.  We focus on registration 
with the central government because this form of registration is more directly relevant to avoiding taxes, 
enforcing contracts, and raising finance.  We will also present statistics on municipal registration and, for 
firms in the Informal survey, industry board registration. In sum, the Informal and Micro surveys allow us 
                                                            
1 We obtain very similar results if the definition of Micro “registered” firms only includes firms that have a tax 
identification number.   10 
 
to examine the productivity of (small) registered and unregistered firms whereas the Enterprise Survey 
provides information on the productivity of registered firms that have at least five employees.  
 
III.B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 lists the African countries surveyed and presents the number of observations and average 
sales for the Informal (Panel A) and Micro samples (Panel B).  Each panel also shows similar statistics for 
a control group of African firms from the Enterprise Survey.  The average 2008 income per capita in 
purchasing power terms is roughly $3,000, and ranges from $313 in Congo to $13,574 in Botswana.   
The Informal Surveys covered 9 countries.  They were carried out between 2003 and 2009 and, 
on average, have 151 firms with non-missing sales in each country.  The Micro surveys were carried out 
in 20 African countries between 2006 and 2009 and, on average, have 109 firms with non-missing sales 
per country.  The World Bank also carried out Enterprise surveys in parallel with the relevant Informal 
and Micro surveys.  We use firms from the Enterprise survey as a control group.  The average number of 
firms in the control group with available sales data is 283 for the Informal sample (Panel A) and 299 for 
the Micro sample (Panel B), and ranges from 53 in Niger (Panel A) to 1,119 in Egypt (in Panel A). 
  Throughout the paper we emphasize productivity differences between registered and unregistered 
firms and between small and big firms.  Critically, whereas firms in the Informal survey are typically 
unregistered, firms in the Micro survey are typically registered.  The average Informal survey has 32 
registered firms out of a total of 151 firms, while the average Micro survey has 78 registered firms out of 
a total of 109 firms.  To examine differences in size, we group Enterprise-survey firms in three categories 
according to the number of employees: (1) fewer than 20 employees (“Small”); between 20 and 99 
employees (“Medium”); and 100 employees or more (“Big”).  When assessing some of our results on 
productivity, it is worth keeping in mind that the distribution of firms across these three categories is 
fairly uneven.  For example, there is one Big firm with non-missing sales data (out of 93) in the 2006 
control group for firms in Cape Verde but 411 (out of 1,119) in the control group for firms in Egypt (see 
Panel A).  Related to the small number of observations, there are few extreme outliers in the data (most 
likely resulting from errors in currency units).  To mitigate the role of outliers, we cap at the 95
th 
percentile the value of sales, sales per employee, and value added per employee in each country and in 
each survey.  Capping does not qualitatively change the results we present.  
  The most striking fact in Table 1 is that the average sales of firms in the Informal and Micro 
surveys is tiny even in comparison with the average annual sales of Small firms in the Enterprise survey.  11 
 
Specifically, average sales are $28,077 for Informal firms but $1,142,822 for Small Enterprise firms in 
the control group.  Similarly, average sales are $65,884 for Micro firms but $449,324 for Small Enterprise 
firms in the control group.  Typically, unregistered firms are even smaller than the average firm in the 
Informal and Micro surveys (Cape Verde in 2006, Mauritania, and Niger are exceptions to this pattern).  
For example, in the Informal survey sample, average sales for unregistered Tanzanian firms are $9,212 
compared to $19,260 for registered firms.  Looking across countries, registered firms in the Informal 
survey sample have average sales $4,877 higher than those of unregistered firms.  Similarly, registered 
firms in the Micro survey sample have sales $32,458 higher than those of unregistered firms.  It is natural 
to worry that the reported sales of unregistered firms may be low because respondents lie about their 
output.  We address this issue in Section V. 
  What do unregistered firms do?  Tables 2 and 3 shed light on some of the basic characteristics of 
firms in the Informal and Micro surveys, respectively.  Both Tables have a similar –but not identical--
structure since there are small differences between the two questionnaires.  For each variable, we present 
the mean for each group (e.g., unregistered, registered, Small, Medium, and Big) as well as t-statistics for 
the difference between the means of different groups of interest (e.g. Small vs. unregistered). To avoid the 
possibility that the results are driven by the country with the most observations, we first average all 
observations within a country and then compute means and t-statistics across countries.   
We discuss both tables in order, beginning with Table 2.  The first block of variables shows some 
general characteristics of the firms.  Unregistered firms, although younger (10.1 years) than the average 
firm in the control group (18.7), have been operating for quite a long time.  By definition, unregistered 
firms are not registered with the central government.  Yet, 35.1% of them are registered with a local 
government agency and 14.3% are registered with an industry board or agency.   
The next four variables describe the assets owned by firms in the Informal survey. The ownership 
of land, although higher among Enterprise survey firms than Informal survey ones, is not significantly 
different among the two groups (45.6% vs. 66.6%).  Similarly, firms in the Informal survey own a smaller 
fraction of the buildings that they occupy than firms in the Enterprise survey (46.2% vs. 52.9%) but this 
difference is not statistically significant.  The ownership of electric generators –a key asset in poor 
countries – is significantly different across firms.  Few unregistered and registered firms own a generator 
(2.7% and 5.6%, respectively).  In contrast, 24.6% of the Small firms in the Enterprise survey and 80.5% 
of Big firms in that survey own a generator.  Capacity utilization rates do not vary much between 
unregistered and Enterprise survey firms (56.4% vs. 65.2%, respectively).  The evidence suggests that 
firms in the Informal and Enterprise survey may not share the same clients.  Only 1.8% of the firms in the 12 
 
Informal survey make the largest fraction of their sales to large firms.  In contrast, large firms are the 
main client of 13.9% of the firms in the Enterprise survey.   
  The next block of variables describes the employees and their human capital in the Informal 
survey.  Unsurprisingly, unregistered firms have the smallest average number of employees (3.0). The key 
fact regarding informal firms is that –consistent with the dual view but not with the other two views-- 
their top managers have low human capital.  For example, the probability that the top manager of a firm 
has some college education is only 7.2% if the firm is unregistered compared to 8.5% for registered firms 
and 66.9% for all firms in the Enterprise survey.  To summarize the differences in human capital, we 
create an index ranging from 1 to 4 according to whether the top manager attended primary school, 
secondary school, vocational school, or college.  This index equals 1.8 for managers of unregistered firms 
and 2.9 for managers of Enterprise survey firms.  We construct a similar index for the employees.  Here 
the pattern is strikingly different than for top managers. Employees of informal firms have very similar 
levels of education as those of Enterprise survey firms (2.4 vs. 2.2). 
  Next, we turn to how firms are financed.  Only 16.9% of the unregistered Informal survey firms 
have ever had a commercial loan.  Instead, they finance 66.8% of investment with internal funds and 
10.4% with help from the family.  The most striking fact about financing is that all small firms –and not 
just unregistered ones--- lack access to finance.  In fact, Small firms in the Enterprise survey finance 
73.9% of their investment with internal funds and 2.8% with family funds.  Big firms in the enterprise 
survey have more access to external finance than small ones.  For example, internal funds pay for 60.7% 
of the investment of Big firms rather than for 66.8% as in the case of unregistered firms.  Yet, the fact that 
all Small firms lack access to finance suggests that it may be misguided to put access to finance for 
unregistered firms at the center of the development agenda.  
  Finally, there is no evidence in the Informal survey that these young unregistered firms are 
dynamic engines of employment creation.  Specifically, the two-year average growth rate of employment 
is 7.4% for unregistered  firms, 8.9% for registered firms, and 7.8% for all Enterprise survey firms.   
Moreover, the median the two-year average growth rate of employment is 0% for both unregistered and 
registered firms, and 2.1% for all Enterprise survey firms.  
  Firms in the Micro sample show very similar patterns as those in the Informal sample (see Table 
3).  For this reason, we discuss them only briefly focusing on the questions that are only available on the 
Micro questionnaire and on the few results that are different between the two questionnaires.  The Micro 
questionnaire gives us a bit more insight into the firms’ assets.  Only 17.2% of the unregistered firms and 
13.4% of the registered ones are located in the owners’ house.  Most unregistered (71.4%) and registered 13 
 
firms (80.4%) occupy a permanent structure. However, there is evidence of hardship resulting from the 
lack of secure title (De Soto, 2000).  Specifically, 11.3% of registered firms and 8.8% of unregistered 
firms were forced to move in the previous year because of lack of secure title.   
Much like their counterparts in the Informal survey, unregistered firms in the Micro sample are 
significantly less likely to own a generator than all other firms.  The shortage of generators is suggestive 
of insufficient capital since only 60% of the unregistered firms have an electric connection to the grid.  
Furthermore, unregistered  firms are much less likely to use their own transportation equipment than 
registered firms (6.6% vs. 22.9%, respectively).  Consistent with the view that unregistered and Enterprise 
survey firms may serve different clients, Big firms export 22.2% of their sales while unregistered firms 
export only 0.8% of their sales.  Finally, there is evidence that unregistered firms have less access to 
computers than do other firms.  In particular, unregistered firms are less likely to use email to 
communicate with their clients than either registered or Enterprise survey firms (3.2%, 9.1%, and 47.7%, 
respectively).  Similarly, unregistered firms are less likely to use a webpage to connect with clients than 
either registered or Enterprise survey firms (0.9%, 2.8%, and 17.6%, respectively).   
Unregistered firms in the Micro sample – unlike their counterparts in the Informal sample – have 
a faster average growth rate of employment than firms in the Enterprise Survey.  The average annual 
employment growth rate of unregistered firms (17.1%), while not quite matching the growth rate of 
registered firms (19.9%), exceeds that of Enterprise survey firms (13.4%).  However, this finding needs to 
be interpreted cautiously for two reasons.  First, the median growth rate of employment is 0% for 
unregistered firms and 11.8% for Enterprise survey firms.  Second, the sales and employment levels of 
unregistered firms remain very small despite having been around for 8 years.   
To complement the evidence on growth rates, we examine how often registered firms initially 
started operating as unregistered.  The Enterprise survey files have available a question on whether firms 
were registered when they started operations.  Table 4 shows the available data regarding the initial legal 
status of firms in twenty three African countries and, for comparison purposes, summary statistics for 14 
Latin American countries.  The fraction of firms that were registered initially ranges from 56.1 in Ivory 
Coast to 96.1 in Eritrea, and averages 81%.  Since 1.3% of the respondents did not answer the question, 
we estimate that 18% of the firms registered after starting operations.  For comparison, 90% of Enterprise 
survey firms in Latin America were registered when they started operations.  In sum, firms rarely start as 
unregistered and later change their status.  Bearing in mind that the number of unregistered firms in our 14 
 
sample is likely to greatly exceed the number of registered firms, this is not the pattern that we would 
expect to see if the informal sector were a reservoir of entrepreneurial talent.
 2,3   
We conclude this section by presenting some data on the institutional environment in which firms 
operate.  All observers of informality agree on the basic tradeoff faced by firms (i.e. taxes and regulatory 
burden vs. public goods and finance).  The previous literature has emphasized access to public goods as 
one of the main attractions of operating in the formal sector.  Table 5 presents data on the institutional 
environment faced by firms and on how they operate in it.  Panel A shows results for the Informal survey 
and Panel B for the Micro survey.    
Three facts stand out.  First, unregistered firms enjoy tangible advantages.  Specifically, managers 
of unregistered firms in the Informal sample estimate that a typical firm in their sector evades 54.5% of its 
tax liability.  Tax evasion sharply decreases with firm size.  For example, managers of Small firms in the 
control group estimate that a typical firm in their sector evades 27.6% of its liability and tax evasion drops 
to 18.2% for Big firms in the control group.  Tax evasion by unregistered Micro firms and Small firms in 
the control group follows a similar pattern (62.3% vs. 41.0%, respectively).     
Likewise, the regulatory burden increases rapidly with firm size.  Whereas managers of 
unregistered firms in the Informal (Micro) sample report spending 9.5% (4.5%) of their time dealing with 
government regulations, that task requires 14.3% (11.4%) of time for managers of Big firms in the control 
group.  Finally, the evidence regarding the relationship between formality and bribes is mixed.   
Specifically, managers of unregistered firms in the Informal survey estimate that firms in their sectors pay 
6.9% of their sales to “get things done” while managers of firms in the control group  report that bribes 
equal 3.4% of sales.  In contrast,  managers of unregistered firms in the Micro survey estimate that firms 
in their sectors pay 3.4% of their sales to “get things done” while  managers of firms in the control group 
report that bribes equal 5.9% of sales.  In sum, although perhaps partially offset by higher bribe payments, 
lower taxes and less regulation confer a clear cost advantage to unregistered firms.  
                                                            
2 To get a benchmark that may be useful to calibrate the figures in Table 5, assume that there are 1,000,000 workers 
and that half of them work for informal firms.  Moreover, assume that the average informal firm has 2 employees 
and that the average formal firm has 10 employees.  Finally, assume that 10% of the firms go out of business in any 
given year.  Then, 25,000 informal firms and 5,000 formal firms are formed each year.  If unregistered firms had a 
yearly 2.2% (=(50,000/250,000)*0.1/(1-0.1)) probability of registering (and of increasing employment to 10 
workers), all 50,000 registered firms started operations in the unofficial sector.  
 
3 Interestingly, African firms that start operations without being registered take a long time do to do so.  For 
example, only 35.6% of the initially unregistered African firms had registered by the end of the sixth year of 
operations (results not reported).  This slow transition into the formal sector is inconsistent with theoretical models 
where entry into the informal sector allows entrepreneurs to acquire information (e.g. about demand for the firm’s 
products) at a lower cost than entry into the formal sector (Bennett and Estrin, 2007).   15 
 
Second, the quality of public goods in our sample is very bad.  In the informal survey, 
unregistered firms report that they experienced power outages on 45 days of the previous year.   
Surprisingly, firms in the Enterprise survey fare even worse (65 days on average, difference not 
statistically significant).  On many days, firms experience multiple power outages.  For this reason, the 
number of power outages for the Micro survey is radically higher than the number of days without power 
in the Informal survey. Specifically, unregistered firms in the Micro survey experienced 138.1 power 
outages in the previous year.  This time, Enterprise survey firms do marginally better (96.4 days, 
difference not statistically significant).  In such an environment, only firms large enough to afford a 
generator can be productive.  Outages of water, phones, and transportation are also very high by the 
standards of developed countries.  As a result, the performance of firms that are too small to provide for 
substitutes for public goods (e.g. use their own transportation equipment) may be severely impaired. 
 Third, outright theft is very prevalent in our sample, but small firms do not make much use of 
police and of courts.  Specifically, unregistered firms in the Informal survey report that, in a typical year, 
losses from theft amount to 3.6% of annual sales, ranging from 0.4% in Burkina Faso to 13.6% in 
Uganda.  Small firms in the enterprise survey report smaller losses (1.8%, difference not statistically 
significant).  Somewhat surprisingly, losses as a result of theft appear to be lower for Micro firms (0.8%) 
than for Small firms in the control group (1.8%).  To put these figures in context, note that Enterprise 
Survey respondents estimate losses as a result of theft equal to 0.6% of sales in Germany, 0.2% in Ireland, 
and 0.1% in Spain.   
In response to theft, firms spend heavily on security and make “protection” payments to 
gangsters.  For example, security and protection payments equal respectively 2.4% and 2.6% of the sales 
of unregistered firms in the Informal sample.  Firms in the control group spend a bit more on security 
(2.9%) and much less on protection payments (0.2%).  The police do not appear to play a central role in 
addressing theft.  In fact, most theft is not even reported to the police.  Only 22.7% of the incidents 
suffered by unregistered firms in the Informal survey are reported to the police. In contrast, 32.9% of the 
incidents experienced by registered firms in the Informal survey are reported to the police–still a low 
figure.  This pattern is consistent with the view that unregistered firms may have trouble protecting their 
property rights.  Alternatively, the absolute value of the losses suffered by unregistered firms may be too 
low to justify filing a police complaint.  Firm size does play a role in reporting theft to the police.  
However, even Big firms in the control group for the Informal sample only report to the police roughly 
70% of the theft incidents.       16 
 
Interestingly, small firms do not make much use of courts to adjudicate disputes, either.  Only 
29.2% of unregistered and 33.2% of registered firms in the Micro sample used courts to resolve 
commercial disputes during the previous year.  In the control group, the use of courts to solve commercial 
disputes rises quickly with firm size from 51.3% for Small firms to 81.8% for Big firms.  Surprisingly, 
courts appear to work in a reasonably efficient manner.  It takes roughly 80 days to resolve a commercial 
dispute in the Informal sample countries and approximately 26 days in the Micro sample countries.  The 
fact that unregistered firms and Small firms in the control group behave similarly regarding how they 
solve commercial disputes suggests that inadequate access to courts is unlikely to explain differences in 
productivity between the two groups of firms.  The same argument applies to lack of police protection.         
    The tentative picture that emerges from this section supports the dual view of informality.   
Unregistered firms have been around for a long time (8 to 10 years), but their sales are still trivially small.  
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of formal firms registered when they started.  The small size of 
unregistered firms is symptomatic of uneducated management and low-quality assets.  As we argued in 
the previous section, this also leads to lower quality.  When public goods are unreliable, unregistered 
firms are too small to afford owning generators, computers, or transportation equipment.  They do not 
have large firms as clients.  They do not export.  Despite De Soto’s (2000) emphasis on access to credit as 
the key to igniting the growth of unregistered firms, lack of external finance appears to be an attribute of 
all small firms in poor countries – not just of unregistered firms.  In sum, the limitations of unregistered 
firms appear to be far more severe than acknowledged by their champions.     
 
IV. Productivity of unregistered firms. 
  In this section we examine the productivity of unregistered firms and present the key findings of 
the paper.  In measuring the productivity of unregistered firms, we face severe data limitations.  In 
particular, we do not have information on how much capital these firms have.  The Informal and Micro 
questionnaires do not collect such information since unregistered entrepreneurs typically lack detailed 
records to estimate the value of their assets.  We thus have to measure productivity without capital.    
To this end, we use two crude measures of productivity:  (1) sales per employee; and (2) (gross) 
value added per employee, where (gross) value added is defined as sales net of expenditure on raw 
materials and energy.
4  Thus, we define value added per employee for firm i in industry s:  
                                                            
4 Data on wages is unavailable for most countries in the Informal sample.  For this reason, we are unable to remove 
labor costs from our measure of value added. 17 
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where PsiYsi is the level of sales, PmMsi is expenditure on raw materials, PEEsi is expenditure on energy, 
and Lsi is the number of employees.  The definition of employees includes both full- and part-time 
workers but not seasonal workers.  To the extent that seasonal employment is more prevalent in 
unregistered firms than in the formal sector, we overstate the productivity of unregistered firms.  We use 
expenditure on production inputs (e.g., energy) and machines as crude proxies for capital invested.
5   
 
V.A Measurement error 
  Even aside from the theoretical concerns, we need to deal with the fact that our sales numbers 
come from unofficial firms, raising concerns about measurement error.  There is good reason to worry 
that our productivity measures may be biased since unregistered entrepreneurs may choose to hide output 
not only from the government but also from the World Bank contractors.  For example, de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff (2007) find that micro-enterprises underreport profits by 30% to researchers, 
although they attribute this more to lack of recall than to intentional understatement. 
We offer two pieces of evidence that support the view that biases are unlikely to drive the main 
results in the paper.  First, Table 6 shows the available information regarding expenditure on various 
production inputs (scaled by sales).  If unregistered entrepreneurs lied only about sales, inputs as a 
fraction of sales would be higher for unregistered firms than for other firms.  Moreover, such differences 
should be very large given that, on average, the sales of small Enterprise survey firms are roughly 40 (10) 
times larger than the sales of firms in the Informal (Micro) survey. In fact, unregistered firms do spend 
more on inputs than firms in the control group but such differences are small in economic terms and 
generally not statistically significant.  For example, expenditure on raw materials by Small firms in the 
control group is 2.1 percentage points lower than for unregistered firms in the Informal sample and 0.1 
percentage points higher than for unregistered firms in the Micro sample (differences are not statistically 
significant).  Differences in expenditure on energy are the only statistically significant difference 
                                                            
5 This approach to productivity measurement has recently received considerable criticism, since the sales measure 
obviously combines physical output and prices.  We obtain qualitatively similar results by following the 
methodology proposed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to address this issue and model the equilibrium prices that 
should prevail in a competitive equilibrium (results not reported).  Moreover, Foster et al. (2008) gather data on both 
sales and prices and find that the correlation between the sales-based and corrected measures of productivity is 
incredibly high, well over 0.9.   
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consistent with the hypothesis that unregistered firms lie.  Specifically, expenditure on energy by Small 
firms in the control group is 4.9 percentage points lower than for unregistered firms in the Informal 
survey and 0.3 percentage points lower than for unregistered firms in the Micro sample.  In contrast, 
expenditure on machines by Small firms in the control group is 4.1 percentage points higher than by 
unregistered firms in the Micro sample but essentially equal to that by unregistered firms in the Informal 
sample.  Finally, there is weak evidence that unregistered firms in the Informal survey spend more on 
labor and land than Small firms in the control group.  In sum, there is no evidence that the enormous 
differences in size between unregistered firms and Small firms in the control group that we see in Table 1 
are the result of underreporting by unregistered firms.  
Second, Table 7 shows the available data on wages per employee.  Under the dual hypothesis, 
unregistered firms should pay low wages (Harris and Todaro 1970).  These low wages may be consistent 
with some on-the-job home production by workers in unregistered firms.  Alternatively, workers in 
unregistered firms may be less skilled that those in registered firms.  Either way, the dual view predicts 
that the measured output of unregistered firms should be low relative to the output of workers in the 
control group.  In contrast, wages in the formal and informal sectors should be comparable if observed 
differences in productivity are due only to measurement error.  Panel A shows wages per employee in 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Cape Verde – the only African countries in the Informal sample with wage 
data.  Panel B shows wages per employee for the countries covered by the Micro sample.  Wages are 
scaled by income per capita.   
Three facts stand out.  First, there is no clear correlation between size and wages within the 
control group.  For example, Big firms pay higher wages than do Small firms in Cameroon and Togo.  
The reverse is true in Burkina Faso and Rwanda.  On average, wages in Big and Small firms are 
indistinguishable from each other.  Second, unregistered firms consistently pay lower wages than Small 
firms in the control group.  Burundi illustrates this point.  Wages in unregistered firms equal 1.76 times 
per capita income.  In contrast, wages in the control group of Small firms equal 5.84 times per capita 
income. On average, in the Micro sample, wages are 1.96 times per capita income in unregistered firms 
and 3.32 times per capita income in Small firms.  Third, although there is considerable heterogeneity 
across countries, the workers of unregistered firms are not the poorest among the poor.  In Rwanda, for 
example, wages for the employees of unregistered firms exceed GDP per capita by 29%.  Similarly, in the 
Micro sample, the average wage of unregistered workers is roughly equal to twice GDP per capita.  Taken 
at face value, the large wedge in wages between unregistered firms and the control group is strongly 
consistent with the dual view of unregistered firms.  Of course, we cannot rule out the alternative 19 
 
interpretation that respondents shrewdly lie to the World Bank about sales, inputs, and wages.  However, 
the findings on inputs and wages should allay some of the concerns regarding data quality.      
As a final point, it seems to us that concerns about intentional understatement of revenues should 
not be exaggerated for our data.  Firms participating in the surveys do so voluntarily.  Virtually all of 
them answer questions about sales, even though they do not have to.  They also give answers suggesting 
massive underpayment of taxes and bribe payments by “firms like theirs.”  This is not behavior of those 
fearful that World Bank contractors will turn them in (or that authorities would do anything about it).  Our 
view is that most informal firms operate in the open, that they have done so for years, that they pay the 
police and other authorities to leave them alone, and that fear of reprisals for truly reporting revenues to 
the World Bank is very far from their minds.  This particular concern is a rich-country fear rather than a 
poor country reality. 
 
IV.B Productivity of unregistered firms   
Table 8 presents the main findings in the paper.  Panel A shows estimates of (log) value added 
per employee for the Informal sample and its Enterprise Survey control group.  Panel B shows analogous 
data for the Micro sample.  Two key facts stand out.  First, consistent with the anecdotal evidence in 
Section II, unregistered firms are significantly less productive than the Enterprise Survey firms.  The 
productivity gap between unregistered firms and even the Small firms in the control group is truly 
enormous.  Firms in Egypt in the 2008 Informal survey illustrate this pattern.  Value added per employee 
for Small firms is 180% higher than for unregistered firms.  The example of Egypt is representative of the 
results for other countries although differences in value added per employee are not statistically 
significant in 7 out of 18 cases.  On average, based on the Informal sample, the productivity of Small 
Enterprise Survey firms is around 120% higher than for unregistered firms. Similarly, based on the Micro 
sample, the productivity wedge between Enterprise Survey Small firms and unregistered firms is 80%.  
Second, Big firms are significantly more productive than Small ones.  Continuing with the 
example of Egypt in 2008, value added per employee is 60% higher for Big firms than for Small firms.  
This large heterogeneity in firm productivity is consistent with work by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) 
showing sizable gaps in the marginal products of labor and capital across plants within narrowly-defined 
industries in China and India.  On average, depending on the sample, value added per employee is 
between 90% and 110% higher for Big firms than that of Small ones. 20 
 
The cumulative effect of these productivity differences is large.  Returning to the example of 
Egypt in 2009, Big firms are 240% more productive than unregistered firms.  On average, value added per 
employee is 250% higher for Big firms in the Informal survey than for the unregistered ones. Similarly, 
value added per employee is 230% higher for the Big firms in the Micro sample than for the unregistered 
ones.      
To illustrate what these differences in productivity mean in practice, consider the average 
unregistered firm in Egypt’s informal survey.  It has value added of $1,138 per employee on sales of 
$1,480 per employee.  In contrast, an average Small firm in the control group has value added of $7,169 
per employee and sales of $16,318 per employee.  If the unregistered firm could achieve the value added 
level of a Small firm only by registering, would it choose to do that?  By assumption, changing its legal 
status would generate $6,031 (=$7,169-$1,138) per employee in additional cash flow.  However, the firm 
would have to pay registration fees and taxes as well as comply with regulations.  The registration fee –
including the value of the entrepreneurs’ time – would probably amount to roughly $1,740 (Djankov et 
al., 2002).  The firm would also need to pay labor taxes (25.6%), corporate taxes (13.8%), and VAT 
(10.0%).  To keep things simple, assume that wages are 20% of sales and that there are no additional 
costs.  Moreover, to bias the example against the firm choosing to register, assume that the firm would 
evade all taxes if unregistered but comply fully if registered. Under these assumptions, wages for the 
Small firm equal $3,264 (=0.20*$16,318) and the hypothetical firm would owe additional payments of 
$835 (=0.256*$3,264) in labor taxes, $539 in corporate taxes (=0.138*($7,169-$3,264)), and VAT of 
$391 (=0.10*($7,169-$3,264). Thus, the firm would have to disburse $3,505 per employee in taxes and 
fees.  In this back-of-the-envelope calculation, the firm would pocket $2,526 (=$6,031-$3,505) per 
employee by registering. 
 
Of course, the gains would be even larger if the unregistered firm could –merely by registering -- 
duplicate the value added per employee of Big firms in the control group.  On average, such firms have 
value added per employee of $12,440 on sales of $29,733.  Calculations similar to the preceding ones 
suggest that the unregistered firm would gain $6,494 per employee if -- only by registering-- it could 
duplicate the level of value added per employee of Big firms. 
   
A similar set of calculations illustrates that unregistered entrepreneurs can simply not afford to 
pay taxes unless sales sharply increase from merely registering.  Under the assumption that wages equal 
20% of sales (=$296), the average unregistered firm has a pre-tax profit per employee of $842 (=$1,138-21 
 
$296) and owes taxes of $276 per employee.
6  Unless sales dramatically increase as a result of registering, 
the average unregistered firm would have considerable difficulty paying $1,740 to register.      
 
Given the very large difference in productivity between unregistered firms and the control group, 
the cost of complying with government regulations would have to be implausibly high to justify operating 
as an unregistered firm. A more realistic scenario is that –consistent with the dual view -- unregistered 
firms would not be able to achieve the performance of Small firms just by registering.  Perhaps, for 
example, unregistered firms lack the human capital necessary to match the quality of the goods produced 
by formal firms.  The image of unregistered firms consistent with their observed levels of productivity is 
not that of predators but rather that of relics of the past.    
 
  What accounts for the large difference in productivity between unregistered firms and the control 
group?  We begin by running simple OLS regressions and discuss self-selection issues later.  In principle, 
the productivity differences that we document in Table 8 could be driven by industry effects, by 
differences in inputs, including human capital, or by differences in size.  The goal of the OLS regressions 
that follow is to examine whether unregistered firms remain unusually unproductive after we control for 
these factors.  In simple terms, we interpret the estimated coefficient on the unregistered dummy as a 
measure of our ignorance regarding the production function of unregistered firms.  Killing the 
unregistered dummy would not mean that unregistered firms are as productive as registered ones, but that 
differences in productivity are captured by differences in inputs and scale, as in Rauch’s (1991) selection 
story.   
All specifications include the following four dummy variables:  (1) the firm is in the Informal 
survey; (2) the firm is registered and in the Informal survey; (3) the firm is in the Micro survey; and (4) 
the firm is registered and in the Micro survey.  Firms in the Enterprise survey are the omitted category.  
We then add –one at a time – (log) income per capita, eight industry dummies, expenditure on raw 
materials, expenditure on energy, expenditure on machines, the index of manager education, and (log) 
sales.
7  All three expenditure variables are scaled by employees.  
                                                            
6 Such firm owes $76 in labor taxes (=0.17*$296), $116 in corporate taxes (=0.138*($1,138-$296)), and $84 in 
VAT (=0.10*(1,138-$296)).      
7 Errors are clustered at the country level. We do not include country fixed effects since the frequency of 
unregistered firms in our sample may not reflect the incidence of unregistered firms in the population.  22 
 
Table 9 shows OLS regressions using (log) value added per employee as the dependent variable.
8  
The first regression only includes dummies for whether the firm is in the Informal sample or in the Micro 
sample, and the interactions between each of those two variables and whether the firm is registered.   
The regression results confirm the findings in Table 8.  The estimated coefficients equal -1.57 for 
the Informal sample and -1.29 for the Micro one.  Moreover, the interactions of Informal and Micro with 
registered equal 0.16 and 0.49, respectively.  All four dummies are highly statistically significant except 
for the interaction between Informal and registered.  Adding GDP per capita does not change the basic 
pattern.  Similarly, the estimated coefficients for the four dummies barely change as we add industry 
controls.  Coefficients do change when we add expenditure on raw materials.  Specifically, the estimated 
coefficients on the dummies for the Informal and Micro surveys drop to -0.81 and -1.00, respectively, 
while the estimated coefficient for the interaction between Micro and registered drops to 0.33.  Adding 
expenditure on energy further lowers the estimated coefficients on the four dummies but not significantly 
so. The four coefficients barely change as we add expenditure on machinery.  The coefficients for 
expenditure on raw materials, energy, and machines are not only statistically significant but also 
economically important.  For example, increasing raw materials by one standard deviation is associated 
with a 47% increase in value added.  Similar increases in expenditure on energy and machines have 
somewhat smaller effects (31% and 15% percentage points, respectively).  Coefficients fall another notch 
when we add manager education.  Interestingly, ignoring selection issues, the estimated coefficient on 
manager education suggests that a top manager with some college education increases value added per 
employee by 44 percentage points (=0.1452 X 3) relative to a top manager with some lower school 
education.  Finally, there is no evidence that unregistered firms are unusually unproductive once we 
control for (log) sales.  Specifically, the estimated coefficients on both Informal and Micro switch signs 
when we add (log) sales to the regression.  In fact, the coefficients on both Informal and Micro are not 
only positive but also significant.  The interaction between registered and Micro is the only interaction 
dummy that remains statistically significant.  Finally, in the regressions that control for sales, the 
estimated coefficient on the education of the top manager is significant but has the “wrong” sign.   
 
IV.C Selection   
The OLS results in this section suggest that unregistered firms are not unusually unproductive 
once we take into account their expenditure on inputs, the human capital of their top managers, and their 
                                                            
8 We obtain qualitatively similar results using (log) sales per employee or a measure of (log) real output based on 
Hsieh and Klenow (2007).  23 
 
small size.  Of course, these are all endogenous variables.  Indeed, the dual view of informality 
emphasizes the sorting process that matches able managers with good assets.  High quality managers are 
willing to pay taxes and bear the cost of government regulation in exchange for being able to advertise 
their products, raise outside capital, and access public goods.  In contrast, low quality managers avoid 
taxes and regulations since the benefits of operating in formal economy are less valuable for small firms.     
Table 10 examines the sorting process.  Specifically, we examine the relationship between the 
quality of the firm’s assets and the human capital of its top manger –our only proxy for managers’ ability.  
The dependent variables fall into two categories:  dummy variables (Panel A) and continuous variables 
(Panel B). The dummy variables include indicators for whether: (1) the firm is registered; (2) the firms 
has ever had a loan; (3) the main buyers are large firms; (4) the firm occupies a permanent structure; (5) 
the firm is located in the owner’s house; (6) the firm owns the building it occupies; (7) the firm owns the 
land it occupies; (8) the firm uses its own transportation equipment; (9) the firm owns a generator; (10) 
the firm uses email to communicate with clients; (11) the firm uses a website to communicate with 
clients; and (12) the firm has an electrical connection.  Finally, we use five continuous variables as 
dependent variables: (1) the percentage of investment that is financed internally; (2) expenditure on raw 
materials as a fraction of sales; (3) expenditure on energy as a fraction of sales; (4) expenditure on 
machines as a fraction of sales; and (5) capacity utilization.  All regressions control for income per capita 
and include eight industry dummies. 
Many –but not all—the correlations in Table 10 are consistent with sorting on managers’ ability. 
Specifically, the results in Panel A show that managers who attended college are more likely to work for 
firms that are registered, have borrowed from banks, sell to large firms, communicate with clients through 
email, have a webpage, and have an electric connection.  Along the same lines, managers who attended 
college are more likely to work for firms that own land, transportation equipment, and generators.   
Moreover, the results in Panel B show that managers who attended college are more likely to work for 
firms with more external finance and higher capacity utilization.  The economic significance of these 
coefficients is large.  The probability of being registered increases by 69% if the top manager has some 
college education (rather than some lower school education).  Having a top manager with some college 
also has large effects on the probability of ever having borrowed from a bank (+32.2%), the probability of 
selling to large firms (+83.5%), the probability of owning buildings (+26.5%), the probability of owning 
transportation equipment (+41.4%) and  a the probability of having a generator (+84.9%), the probability 
of using email (+126%), the probability of having a webpage (+101%), and the probability of having an 
electrical connection (+121%).  Similarly, having a top manager with some college education reduces the 24 
 
fraction of investment financed with internal funds by 20 percentage points (the standard deviation is 
32%), and increases capacity utilization by 20 percentage points (the standard deviation is 22.7%).  
In contrast, the evidence regarding the probability of occupying a permanent structure is weak.  
The only significant coefficient is for vocational schooling.  Nor is there evidence that either expenditure 
on raw materials or the probability of owning buildings increases with managers’ education.  Finally, two 
regressions have statistically significant coefficients with the “wrong” sign:  the likelihood that the firm 
operates in the house of the owner is higher when managers have attended secondary or vocational 
schools rather than lower schools and expenditure on energy is lower if the top manager attended college 
rather than lower schools.      
These results suggest an explanation for the puzzling low productivity of unregistered firms.  The 
productivity gap between registered firms and the control group disappears once we take into account 
crude proxies for physical and human capital and control for size.  Of course, size is an endogenous 
variable.  These results on manager selection are broadly consistent with the view that part of the reason 
why unregistered firms are small is that they are run by managers of low ability (Rauch 1991).  These 
managers do not find it worthwhile to pay the cost of running a formal firm.  In sum, unregistered firms 
are small because they are run by less able managers and, as such, face a high cost of capital, few 
opportunities to advertise their products, and insufficient scale to own critical assets such as generators 
and computers.  The evidence from our visits suggests that, for all these reasons, they also produce low 
quality products, which are not demanded by formal customers.  
 
V. Obstacles to Doing Business. 
  As a final step, we present information on obstacles to doing business, as reported by respondents 
in the Micro and Enterprise surveys.
9  Table 11 reports the percentage of firms that identify each of 17 
obstacles as the most important one for their firm.     
  Three findings stand out.  First, the business obstacles facing firms in the Micro and Enterprise 
Survey are similar. Second, there is considerable agreement that access to electricity and finance are 
serious obstacles.  Specifically, 32.9% of Big firms in the Enterprise Survey and 20% of the firms in the 
Micro Survey regard access to electricity ranks as the most serious obstacle to doing business.  Similarly, 
access to finance ranks as the most serious obstacle to doing business for 14.4% of Big firms in the 
Enterprise Survey and 23.1% of firms in the Micro Survey.  Third, beyond access to electricity and 
                                                            
9 Results for firms in the Informal survey and their control group are qualitatively similar. 25 
 
finance, there is considerable disagreement regarding the importance of the other obstacles to doing 
business.  For example, only 9.8% of Big firms in the Enterprise Survey and 5.4% of the firms in the 
Micro Survey identify tax rates as the most serious obstacle to business.  Neither the Micro  Survey firms 
nor the Enterprise survey firms consider access to land, labor regulations, business licensing and permits, 
the legal system, tax administration, corruption, crime, transportation, customs and trade regulations, 
political instability or the education of the workforce to be major obstacles to doing business.   
  We can also use the information on obstacles to shed light on the McKinsey Global Institute view 
that informal firms compete unfairly with formal ones.  Respondents provide an assessment of whether 
the “practices of competitors in the informal economy” are an obstacle to their business.  Contrary to the 
McKinsey view, “practices of competitors in the informal economy” are perceived as the top obstacle by 
roughly 9% of the managers of firms in either the Micro or the Enterprise survey. Moreover, the 
perception of informal practices as a top business obstacle by managers of firms in the Enterprise Survey 
is a significant concern only in four countries: Swaziland (28%), Mauritius (18%), Mauritania (16%), and 
Togo (16%).  Second, the answer is slightly lower for the Enterprise Survey firms than for the informal 
Micro firms (8.9% vs. 9.7%), which is not consistent with the view that the informal firms undercut 
formal ones.  Third, one might have guessed that it is the Small registered firms in the Enterprise survey 
that would be mostly severely affected by the informal firms.  However, informal practices are an equally 
serious obstacle for both groups of firms (9.4% vs. 9.3%).  None of this evidence is supportive of unfair 
competition.   
A final piece of evidence comes from perceptions regarding the benefits and costs of registering.  
Specifically, five Informal survey questionnaires include questions regarding the benefits of registration 
while fourteen Micro survey questionnaires include questions regarding obstacles to registration.  Panel A 
in Table 12 reports the percentage of respondents who rank each possible answer as either the most 
important or second most important benefit of registration.  The main benefits of registering are improved 
access to financing (67%), raw materials (27%), and markets (12%)– broadly consistent with the previous 
findings about the obstacles to doing business faced by informal firms.  Better access to workers (1%), 
infrastructure services (2%), property rights (5%), government services (8%), opportunities with formal 
firms (9%), and lower bribes (12%) are not nearly as important.    
On the cost side, Panel B in Table 12 reports the percentage of respondents who rank each 
possible answer as either a “very serious obstacle” or a “major obstacle” to register a business.  The main 
obstacles to registration are the financial (34%) and administrative (26%) burden of taxes as well as the 
cost of registering (29%) and the need to comply with minimum capital requirements (25%).  There is 26 
 
also suggestive evidence that, at least in some countries, firms perceive the bribes that registered firms 
pay as a reason to remain informal.  Specifically, 85% of the respondents in Ivory Coast rate the bribes 
that registered firms pay as a top obstacle.  Unfortunately, Madagascar is the only other country where the 
Micro questionnaire asked about bribes as an obstacle to registering.  In that country, 20% of the 
respondents report that bribes in the formal sector are a top obstacle to registering.  Labor regulation 
(16%) and the difficulty of obtaining information about how to register (18%)  are seen as somewhat  less 
important.  Here as well, the picture that emerges is one in which the formal firms have better access to 
markets, services, and finance, and hence can be much more productive, but need to pay taxes (and, 
perhaps, bribes).  Presumably, for the unregistered firms, the tax price is too high to justify registration.   
In summary, between their extreme inefficiency and operation in very different markets, informal 
firms do not appear to pose much of a threat to the formal firms, at least as perceived by the latter.  
Informal firms clearly recognize the many benefits of being official, including access to markets and to 
finance (although it is far from clear that they would gain the latter even if they registered).  They do not 
seem to think that regulation, or the cost of registration, and the biggest obstacles to registration.  On the 
other hand, they do see taxes as a huge problem.  Overall, the do not seem to be productive enough for the 
benefits of formality to justify the costs.  
 
VI. Conclusion. 
Our most basic finding is that in Africa, as in other parts of the world, high productivity comes 
from formal firms, and in particular large formal firms.  Productivity jumps sharply if we compare small 
formal firms to informal firms, and rises rapidly with the size of formal firms.  To the extent that 
productivity growth is central to economic development, the formation and growth of formal firms is 
necessary for economic growth (see also Lewis 2004, Banerjee and Duflo 2005). 
  Formal firms appear to be very different animals than informal firms, which accounts for their 
sharply superior productivity.  Perhaps most importantly, they are run by much better educated managers.  
As a consequence, besides being larger, they tend to use more capital, have different customers, market 
their products, and use external finance to a greater extent than do the informal firms.  Our visits to 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and Kenya suggest that formal firms also produce higher quality products, which 
may account for substantial market segmentation between formal and informal firms.  There is no 
evidence that informal firms become formal as they grow.  Rather, virtually none of the formal firms had 27 
 
ever been informal.  It does not appear from the available evidence that informal firms would sharply 
increase their productivity if only they registered. 
  This interpretation raises the crucial question of what happens to informal firms as the economy 
develops.  After all, the most basic fact about the informal economy is that its role diminishes sharply as 
incomes grow.  How does this happen?  Do informal firms register or do they die?  We do not have a 
definitive answer to this question, but what we have points in the direction of death rather than 
registration.  It is still possible of course that a minority of informal firms, and especially the most 
productive ones, end up joining the formal economy, perhaps by supplying formal firms.  But there is no 
evidence, at least in our data, that this is the typical story.  The vast majority of informal firms appear to 
begin and to end their lives as unproductive informal firms.    
  Informal firms nonetheless play a crucial role in developing economies.  They represent over half 
of the economic activity in Africa. They provide livelihood to billions of poor people.  Because these 
firms are so inefficient, taxing them or forcing them to comply with government regulations would likely 
put most of them out of business, with dire consequences for their employees and proprietors.  If 
anything, strategies that keep these firms afloat and allow them to become more productive, such as 
microfinance, are probably desirable from the viewpoint of poverty alleviation.  But these are not growth 
strategies: making unofficial firms official will not yield substantial improvements in productivity.  
  Growth strategies, then, need to focus on formal firms, especially the larger ones.  Surely 
reducing the costs of formality, such as registration costs, is a good idea, but this is not the whole story.  
Likewise, some of the almost-standard proposals for development, such as improving land rights, the 
legal environment, and even the human capital of the employees appear to be relatively minor factors 
from the viewpoint of official entrepreneurs.  The main obstacles to the operations of formal firms, 
according to our data, are: 1) human capital of entrepreneurs, 2) taxation, 3) electricity, and 4) finance.  
Improvements in each of these areas can promote the growth of large firms, and thus growth overall.  




Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2005. “Growth Theory through the Lens of Development 
Economics.” In Handbook of Economic Growth, 1A, edited by Steve Durlauf and Philippe Aghion, 
473–552. Holland: Elsevier Science.  
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2007. “The Economic Lives of the Poor.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21, no. 1: 141-68. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo. 2008.  “What is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the 
World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 2: 3-28.  
de Mel, Suresh, David John McKenzie, and Christopher M. Woodruff. 2007.  “Measuring 
Microenterprise Profits: Don't Ask How the Sausage is Made.”  World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 4229. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=985001. 
de Soto, Hernando. 2000.  The Mystery of Capital.  Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else.  New York: Basic Books.  
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2002. “The 
Regulation of Entry.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1: 1–37. 
Farrell, Diana. 2004. “The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy.” McKinsey Quarterly 2004, no. 3: 
26–37. 
Forster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson.  2008.  “Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and 
Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability?”  American Economic Review 98, no. 1: 394-
425.  
Friedman, Eric, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido.  2001.  “Dodging the Grabbing 
Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries.  Journal of Public Economics 76, no. 
3: 459-93. 
Harris, John, and Michael Todaro. 1970. “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector 
Analysis.”  American Economic Review 60, no. 1: 126-142.  
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter Klenow. 2009. “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 4: 1403-48.  
La Porta, Rafael, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. “The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall: 275-352.  
Lewis, William. 2004.  The Power of Productivity: Wealth, Poverty, and the Threat to Global Stability.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Murphy, Kevin, and Andrei Shleifer. 1997.  “Quality and Trade.”  Journal of Development Economics 53: 
1-15. 29 
 
Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1989.  “Industrialization and the Big Push.”  Journal 
of Political Economy 97, no. 5: 1003-26. 
Rauch, James. 1991. “Modeling the Informal Sector Formally.” Journal of Development Economics 35, 
no. 1: 33-47.  Year Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs.
Burkina Faso 2009 18,262 111 . 18,262 111 1,226,313 196 4,590,659 105 10,800,000 56 3,719,511 357
Cameroon 2009 19,839 121 . 19,839 121 309,663 144 2,996,489 124 44,300,000 70 10,400,000 338
Cape Verde 2006 29,917 85 18,922 18 27,996 103 374,308 69 1,738,857 23 4,149,963 1 752,375 93
Cape Verde 2009 83,190 82 . 83,190 82 498,339 66 2,548,385 50 3,860,018 21 1,761,825 137
Egypt, Rep. 2008 19,572 159 29,346 28 21,035 187 1,335,882 350 5,160,261 358 28,800,000 411 12,600,000 1,119
Kenya 2003 20,297 149 30,712 36 22,323 185 1,675,268 49 6,070,552 65 31,800,000 41 11,500,000 155
Niger 2005 15,169 48 14,927 58 15,037 106 4,999,650 34 4,416,983 16 14,700,000 3 5,371,892 53
Senegal 2003 24,944 153 29,827 41 25,976 194 433,291 86 4,542,087 90 18,400,000 35 5,169,733 211
Tanzania 2003 9,212 285 19,260 23 9,963 308 278,088 77 3,754,425 62 15,700,000 38 4,796,542 177
Uganda 2003 35,082 91 45,341 23 37,152 114 297,418 107 3,222,021 58 10,700,000 28 2,681,279 193
Average 27,549 128 26,905 32 28,077 151 1,142,822 3,904,072 18,320,998 5,875,316 283
Country Year Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs. Sales Obs.
Angola 2006 22,524 8 46,153 107 44,509 115 219,543 353 440,131 64 826,909 6 261,533 423
Botswana 2006 27,192 27 105,688 73 84,494 100 1,054,364 212 4,027,974 86 9,497,498 39 2,790,306 337
Burkina Faso 2009 177,476 115 . 177,476 115 1,226,313 196 4,590,659 105 10,800,000 56 3,719,511 357
Burundi 2006 31,950 16 44,336 121 42,889 137 262,566 219 1,313,305 43 2,923,213 8 508,740 270
Cameroon 2009 19,671 3 92,758 110 90,817 113 309,663 144 2,996,489 124 44,300,000 70 10,400,000 338
Cape Verde 2009 68,171 31 50,890 73 56,041 104 498,339 66 2,548,385 50 3,860,018 21 1,761,825 137
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2006 20,150 40 32,891 64 27,991 104 156,191 258 779,580 71 1,675,336 11 335,518 340
Gambia, The 2006 12,955 47 20,307 76 17,498 123 191,976 118 975,985 47 3,564,678 7 543,472 172
Guinea 2006 93,345 27 129,568 77 120,164 104 180,759 194 979,018 19 2,246,573 7 315,430 220
Guinea-Bissau 2006 22,532 29 48,451 108 42,965 137 155,735 97 441,720 16 . 196,228 113
Ivory Coast 2009 6,128 47 36,858 45 21,159 92 291,630 247 2,648,291 100 11,400,000 43 2,121,482 390
Madagascar 2009 21,715 3 108,928 98 106,338 101 602,681 128 2,818,355 160 8,207,987 67 3,036,662 355
Mauritania 2006 56,070 69 38,977 53 48,644 122 258,159 181 2,287,588 44 8,216,648 5 819,408 230
Mauritius 2009 50,159 18 102,087 60 90,104 78 1,193,050 168 3,533,822 128 16,900,000 58 4,608,373 354
Namibia 2006 5,392 49 31,419 47 18,134 96 665,167 225 2,917,353 82 9,329,198 17 1,689,759 324
Rwanda 2006 8,295 22 46,821 106 40,199 128 344,204 143 2,071,016 53 7,671,968 16 1,328,946 212
Swaziland 2006 5,658 34 52,230 83 38,696 117 391,593 207 2,418,694 55 6,982,505 32 1,488,191 294
Tanzania 2006 30,093 25 48,327 40 41,314 65 326,825 259 3,430,273 111 16,400,000 44 2,866,305 414
Togo 2009 134,510 139 . 134,510 139 296,217 81 6,774,754 42 27,000,000 17 5,484,240 140
Uganda 2006 43,584 38 93,144 59 73,729 97 361,505 367 1,609,611 149 5,885,212 36 1,058,645 552
Average 42,879 39 62,768 78 65,884 109 449,324 193 2,480,150 77 10,404,618 29 2,266,729 299
Panel B:  Micro Survey
Micro Survey Enterprise Survey
Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Small Medium Big All
Table 1.  Sales of the Informal and Micro Survey Sample Firms
Informal Survey Enterprise Survey
Unregistered Registered All
Panel A:  Informal SurveyGeneral Characteristics:
Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All




% of firms that are registered with a central government agency 0.0% 100.0% 15.5% . . . . . 100.0% . .
% of firms that are registered with a local government agency 35.1% 57.6% 37.2% . . . . . 22.5% . .
% of firms that are registered with an industry board or agency 14.3% 23.7% 16.9% . . . . . 9.4% . .
% of occupied land that is owned by the firm 41.8% 56.0% 45.6% 60.6% 69.2% 73.9% 66.6% 21.0% 14.2% 18.7% 13.4%
% of occupied buildings that is owned by the firm 44.8% 52.9% 46.2% 43.8% 58.7% 69.8% 52.9% 6.7% 8.1% -1.0% 26.1%





Average capacity utilization (%) 56.4% 63.7% 57.7% 62.2% 66.0% 67.4% 65.2% 7.6%
c 7.3% 5.8% 5.1%













% of top managers with primary education 47.3% 42.1% 47.2% 48.6% 38.7% 34.3% 44.1% -3.1% -5.3% 1.3% -14.3%
% of top managers with secondary education 23.7% 14.8% 22.9% 51.1% 42.8% 36.1% 45.6% 22.7% -8.9% 27.3%
b -14.9%
% of top managers with vocational education 13.2% 23.9% 14.0% 45.7% 42.5% 36.6% 43.5% 29.5%
c 10.8% 32.5%
b -9.1%




Index of education of average employee 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3
% of employees with primary education 52.4% 48.3% 51.4% 44.1% 39.6% 39.5% 41.6% -9.8% -4.1% -8.3% -4.6%
% of employees with secondary education 36.9% 40.0% 38.0% 34.7% 30.7% 25.3% 33.8% -4.2% 3.0% -2.2% -9.5%




%firms that have ever had a loan 16.9% 26.6% 18.6% . . . . . 9.7% . .
% of financing from internal funds 68.6% 74.8% 70.7% 73.9% 66.4% 60.7% 69.8% -0.9%
c 6.2% 5.3% -13.2%
b









Avg two-year employment growth 7.4% 8.9% 7.7% 6.5% 8.8% 9.2% 7.8% 0.1% 1.5% 1.0% 2.4%
Median two-year employment growth 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.6% 4.0% 2.1% 2.1%
a 0.0% 1.0% 3.0%
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 2.  Attributes of firms in the Informal Survey Sample









Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All




% of firms that are registered with a central government agency 0.0% 100.0% 72.4% . . . . . 100.0%
. . .
% of firms that are registered with a local government agency 45.9% 82.9% 71.5% . . . . . . . .
% of firms located in the owners home 17.2% 13.4% 13.8% . . . . . -3.9% . .
% of firms located in a permanent structure 71.4% 80.4% 77.0% . . . . . 9.0% . .
% of occupied land that is owned by the firm 22.7% 22.6% 22.7% 30.7% 53.0% 67.4% 37.8% 0.2
a -0.1% 0.4
a
% of firms forced to move last year because of lack of secure title 11.3% 8.8% 9.8% . . . . . -2.5% . .





% of firms with an electrical connection 60.0% 79.2% 73.6% . . . . . 19.2%
c . .
% uses own transportation equipment 6.6% 22.9% 18.2% . . . . . 16.3%
a . .
Hours per week that the firm operates 62.3 61.9 61.5 57.4 58.6 74.9 60.2 -1.4 -39.9% -5.0 17.5
a
% of firms for which the main buyer are large firms 0.1% 2.4% 1.6% . . . . . 2.3%
a . .




























% of top managers with secondary education 26.7% 25.0% 25.0% 24.5% 14.9% 8.7% 20.8% -4.1%
c -1.7% -2.2% -15.8%
a
% of top managers with vocational education 10.7% 13.9% 13.0% 15.7% 13.8% 8.0% 14.6% 1.6% 3.1% 4.9%
b -7.6%
a





Index of education of average employee 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
% of employees with primary education 48.0% 44.3% 46.0% 47.8% 41.8% 31.2% 44.8% -1.2% -3.7% -0.2% -16.5%
b
% of employees with secondary education 47.7% 47.7% 46.9% 42.9% 49.8% 52.8% 45.8% -1.1% 0.0% -4.9% 9.9%
% of employees with college education 4.1% 8.0% 7.0% 9.3% 8.4% 16.0% 9.4% 2.4% 3.9% 5.2%
c 6.6%
Finance
%firms that have ever had a loan 7.3% 12.5% 10.9% . . . . . 5.1%
b .
% of financing from internal funds 79.1% 77.9% 79.4% 75.5% 66.5% 62.9% 72.5% -7.0%
b -1.2% -3.6% -12.6%
a
% of financing from family 6.5% 5.9% 5.7% 4.3% 2.9% 0.7% 3.8% -1.8% -0.5% -2.2% -3.5%
a




Avg two-year employment growth 17.1% 19.9% 17.8% 13.4% 14.3% 10.8% 13.4% -4.4% 2.7% -3.8% -2.6%






a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 3.  Attributes of firms in the Micro Survey Sample
Big vs Small






UnregisteredCountry Number of Observations
% Registered 
at Start
% Does not 
know
Benin 149 83.3% 0.7%
Burkina Faso 381 79.1% 1.8%
Cameroon 360 82.4% 0.3%
Cape Verde 147 81.4% 1.9%
Chad 148 79.3% 1.3%
Congo Rep 142 78.8% 8.6%
Eritrea 152 96.1% 3.9%
Gabon 179 64.2% 1.7%
Ghana 615 63.6% 0.2%
Ivory Coast 524 56.1% 3.2%
Lesotho 150 86.8% 1.3%
Liberia 150 73.3% 1.3%
Madagascar 442 95.7% 0.2%
Malawi 148 88.0% 0.0%
Mali 619 80.9% 0.0%
Mauritius 393 81.9% 2.0%
Mozambique 597 86.3% 0.0%
Niger 127 90.7% 0.0%
Senegal 625 75.8% 0.0%
Sierra Leone 150 86.7% 0.0%
South Africa 1056 88.1% 0.0%
Togo 153 75.5% 0.6%
Zambia 602 88.1% 0.0%
Average Africa 81.0% 1.3%
Average Latin America 90.0% 1.3%
Table 4.  Legal Status of Enterprise Survey Firms in AfricaCompliance with government regulations
Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
% of tax liability evaded by "typical" firm 54.5 37.6 51.4 27.6 24.0 18.2 24.8 -26.7
a -16.9 -26.9
b -9.4
% of management's time spent dealing with government regulations 9.5 7.3 8.4 10.9 16.1 14.3 13.5 5.1
c -2.2 1.4 3.4




Days last year with power outages 45.0 63.2 47.5 58.9 69.6 74.4 65.0 17.5 18.1 13.8 15.6
Days last year with water outages 60.2 70.1 62.6 47.8 50.5 44.1 50.5 -12.0 9.9 -12.5 -3.6
Days last year with telephone outages 7.2 42.6 32.5 27.7 20.5 21.9 23.1 -9.4 35.3 20.5
c -5.8
Days last year with transportation outages 60.0 46.9 58.9 17.0 19.0 17.3 18.0 -40.9 -13.1 -43.1 0.3
Property rights
% of sales lost last year owing to theft 3.6 5.3 3.9 1.8 1.3 0.4 1.4 -2.5 1.8 -1.8 -1.4
% of sales spent on security expenses 2.4 1.9 2.2 2.3 3.2 3.2 2.9 0.7
c -0.5 -0.2 1.0
% of sales spent on "protection payments" 2.6 1.8 2.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 -2.3 -0.8 -2.4
c 0.1
% of incidents reported to the police 22.7 32.9 28.2 46.6 55.1 70.2 55.7 27.5 10.2 23.9 23.6
Days it took a typical court case to be resolved 70.6 105.8 79.7 90.3 73.4 95.7 83.8 4.1 35.2 19.8 5.4
Compliance with government regulations Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All












Number of power outages in the last year 138.1 110.5 118.3 92.9 101.6 103.4 96.4 -21.9 -27.6 -45.2 10.5
Days last year with water outages . . . 78.6 71.0 59.1 69.2 . . . -19.5
Property rights
% of sales lost last year owing to theft 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.1
b -0.1 1.1
c -0.8
% of sales spent on security expenses 3.2 3.9 3.6 2.3 1.9 1.2 2.0 -1.6 0.7 -0.9 -1.1
b
% of firms that had payment dispute in last 2 years 6.0% 8.4% 7.5% 9.5% 16.6% 19.4% 11.4% 4.0%
c 2.3% 3.5% 9.9%
a




Days it took a typical court case to be resolved . 25.7 25.7 . . . . . .
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 5.  Indicators of the Institutional Environment Facing Informal and Micro Survey Firms








Panel A:  Informal Survey
Panel B:  Micro Survey
Micro Survey Enterprise Survey Differences




Big vs SmallUnregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Expenditure on raw materials / Sales (%) 39.5% 43.4% 39.5% 37.3% 37.6% 39.3% 36.9% -2.6% 3.9% -2.1% 1.9%
Expenditure on energy / Sales (%) 9.4% 8.0% 8.7% 4.6% 3.2% 4.0% 5.3% -3.4% -1.4% -4.9%
a -0.5%
Expenditure on labor / Sales (%) 22.4% 21.8% 22.8% 18.3% 15.6% 13.0% 16.3% -6.4%
c -0.6% -4.1% -5.2%
c
Expenditure on machines / Sales (%) 7.3% 9.5% 7.3% 6.9% 8.1% 6.2% 7.4% 0.1% 2.2% -0.4% -0.6%
Expenditure on land / Sales (%) 5.3% 14.4% 6.8% 3.2% 1.4% 2.2% 3.0% -3.8% 9.2% -2.1% -1.0%
Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Expenditure on raw materials / Sales (%) 37.8% 37.6% 36.2% 37.9% 39.6% 38.9% 38.5% 2.3% -0.2% 0.1% 1.0%
Expenditure on energy / Sales (%) 3.9% 3.8% 4.1% 3.6% 3.3% 3.2% 3.5% -0.7% -0.1% -0.3%
c -0.4%
Expenditure on labor / Sales (%) 23.5% 21.3% 22.0% 21.8% 20.3% 15.9% 20.8% -1.3% -2.2% -1.7% -5.9%
a
Expenditure on machines / Sales (%) 4.5% 4.0% 5.2% 8.6% 9.0% 6.1% 7.9% 2.7%
c -0.6% 4.1%
b -2.6%
Expenditure on land / Sales (%) 2.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 1.0% -0.4% -1.6% -1.4% -0.1%
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 6.  Expenditure on Production Inputs by Informal and Micro Survey Firms 
Informal Survey Enterprise Survey
Enterprise vs 
Informal
Panel A:  Informal Survey














Micro Survey Enterprise Survey DifferencesCountry Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Burkina Faso 2009 0.95 . 0.95 3.46 4.46 3.06 3.70 2.75 a . 2.50 a -0.40
Cameroon 2009 0.96 . 0.96 1.90 2.39 3.84 2.50 1.54 a . 0.95 a 1.94 a
Cape Verde 2006 0.90 1.25 0.96 2.92 4.03 . 3.19 2.23
a 0.35 2.03
a .
Cape Verde 2009 0.76 . 0.76 0.66 0.81 0.60 0.71 -0.05 . -0.10 -0.06
Average 0.89 1.25 0.91 2.24 2.92 2.50 2.52 1.62
b 0.35 1.34
c 0.49
Country Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Angola 2006 . 2.23 2.17 3.26 3.02 . 3.20 1.03
a . . .




Burkina Faso 2009 2.76 . 2.76 3.48 4.51 3.06 3.73 0.97
b . 0.72 -0.42




Cameroon 2009 . 1.98 1.95 1.90 2.39 3.84 2.50 0.54
b . . 1.94
a
Cape Verde 2009 1.08 0.89 0.95 0.65 0.80 0.60 0.70 -0.25
b -0.19 -0.43
b -0.05
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2006 5.64 5.45 5.52 8.25 11.35 9.26 8.93 3.41
a -0.18 2.62
a 1.01








Guinea-Bissau 2006 6.11 7.21 6.97 9.64 6.92 . 9.25 2.29
b 1.10 3.53
c .





Madagascar 2009 . 1.11 1.11 2.44 2.66 2.31 2.52 1.40
a . . -0.12
Mauritania 2006 2.12 2.10 2.11 3.88 3.98 . 3.91 1.80
a -0.02 1.76
a .
Mauritius 2009 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.56 0.68 0.68 0.62 0.19
a 0.06 0.17 0.12




Rwanda 2006 1.29 1.52 1.47 4.01 5.70 3.12 4.36 2.89
a 0.23 2.72
a -0.89








Togo 2009 4.61 . 4.61 4.89 12.35 7.74 7.59 2.98
a . 0.28 2.85
Uganda 2006 3.08 3.93 3.60 4.32 4.90 3.91 4.45 0.85
b 0.85 1.24
b -0.42




a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  









Table 7.  Ratio of wages per employee to GDP per capita
Panel B: Micro Survey








Panel A:  Informal Survey
Informal Survey Enterprise SurveyCountry Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All





Cameroon 2006 7.9 . 7.9 8.3 9.3 10.3 9.3 1.4
a . 0.4 2.0
a 2.4
a
Cape Verde 2006 8.1 7.85 8.1 8.5 9.2 . 8.8 0.7
a -0.3 0.4 . .
Cape Verde 2009 8.4 . 8.4 9.0 9.7 . 9.1 0.7
c . 0.6 . .










Niger 2003 . . 8.2 11.4 10.0 . 10.8 2.6
b . . . .





Tanzania 2003 6.2 . 6.2 . . . 8.9 2.6
a . . . .










Country Year Unregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Angola 2006 . 8.3 8.3 9.0 8.9 . 9.0 0.7
a . . . .
Botswana 2006 . 8.8 8.9 9.5 10.0 9.5 9.6 0.8
b . . 0.0 .
Burkina Faso 2009 8.7 . 8.7 9.5 10.0 10.5 10.0 1.3
a . 0.8 1.0
b 1.8
a
Burundi 2006 . 7.8 7.9 8.2 9.2 . 8.5 0.6
a . . . .
Cameroon 2009 . 8.4 8.4 8.9 9.8 10.9 9.9 1.4
a . . 2.0
a .
Cape Verde 2009 8.6 9.0 8.8 9.0 9.7 . 9.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 . .









Guinea 2006 8.0 8.7 8.5 8.3 8.7 . 8.4 -0.1 0.6
c 0.3 . .
Guinea-Bissau 2006 . 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.4 . 8.3 0.0 . . . .






Madagascar 2009 . 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.6 8.5 0.1 . . 0.3 .
Mauritania 2006 8.4 . 8.2 8.7 9.2 . 8.9 0.8
a . 0.3 . .





Namibia 2006 . 7.8 7.5 9.8 10.2 10.4 10.0 2.5
a . . 0.6
b .
Rwanda 2006 . 8.4 8.3 9.1 9.4 9.1 9.2 0.9
a . . 0.0 .
Swaziland 2006 . 8.6 8.5 9.8 9.5 9.6 9.6 1.1
a . . -0.2 .





Togo 2009 . . 8.4 8.8 . . 9.6 1.1 . . . .












a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 8.  Productivity of Firms in the Informal and Micro Sector Survey
Panel A: Log value added per employee for firms in countries covered by the Informal Survey










Informal Survey Enterprise Survey Differences


















(0.2536) (0.2290) (0.2000) (0.2770) (0.2295) (0.2356) (0.2255) (0.1503)
Informal Survey & Registered 0.1565 0.1554 0.1253 -0.0902 -0.0347 -0.0299 -0.0678 0.0081










(0.2440) (0.2357) (0.2411) (0.2324) (0.1997) (0.1979) (0.1841) (0.0854)









(0.1694) (0.1586) (0.1487) (0.1050) (0.1053) (0.1051) (0.1047) (0.0479)
LN (GDP Per Capita) 0.1957 0.1796 0.1818
c 0.1594 0.1537 0.1718
c 0.0672
(0.1300) (0.1236) (0.1036) (0.0950) (0.0912) (0.0877) (0.0686)











(0.0322) (0.0309) (0.0299) (0.0140)



















(0.1174) (1.0042) (0.9944) (1.3749) (1.1439) (1.1158) (1.0716) (0.6269)
Observations 4,075 4,075 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955 3,955
Adjusted R-Squared 14% 15% 19% 34% 38% 39% 40% 66%
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 9.  Regressions explaining value added per employeeRegistered 
with central 
government
































a 0.2416 0.1396 0.2473




























(0.1916) (0.0994) (0.2682) (0.2122) (0.1164) (0.2500) (0.1036) (0.1097) (0.2269) (0.1452) (0.1113) (0.2204)
Ln(GDP/POP) 0.0447 -0.0294 0.0508 -0.2605
a -0.1220 -0.1010 -0.1077 0.0375 -0.1220 0.1119 0.1004 -0.0630








(1.5093) (0.4245) (0.9284) (0.8811) (0.9311) (1.8687) (0.6188) (0.7875) (0.8682) (0.9104) (0.6832) (1.3772)
Obs 2,390 2,224 1,288 1,429 1,439 1,494 7,375 1,438 5,308 8,069 8,112 1,439
Pseudo R
2 8% 3% 11% 4% 2% 11% 5% 3% 11% 13% 9% 13%
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Table 10:  Manager ability and self-selection












Secondary School -0.9120 -0.0237 -0.4084 -0.7236 0.9662
(2.1722) firms  (0.5400) (0.7365) (2.0966)
Vocational School -0.6260 -0.0100 -0.5316 0.6415 4.6005
c





(1.9788) (0.0236) (0.4958) (0.8975) (2.2222)
Ln(GDP/POP) -4.3642
a -0.0157 0.1985 0.8420 0.7082






(9.1257) (0.1581) (1.8890) (4.8612) (5.0422)
Obs 8641 4729 7780 7472 3578
Adj R







Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: 
a significant at the 1% level.  
b significant at the 5% level.  
c significant at the 10% level.
Dependent Variables
Table 10 -- Manager ability and self-selection (continued)
Panel B: OLS RegressionsUnregistered Registered All Small Medium Big All
Obstacles (% of firms identifying an obstacle as the most important)
Macro Instability 4.0% 8.0% 7.0% . . . . . . . .
Telecommunications 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% . . . . . -0.1% . .
Electricity 17.1% 23.4% 20.0% 30.0% 31.3% 32.9% 30.4% 10.4% 6.3% 12.9%
c 2.9%
Access to Financing 29.2% 20.0% 23.1% 20.0% 17.7% 14.4% 18.6% -4.5% -9.1%
c -9.2%
b -5.6%
Tax Rates 4.5% 6.3% 5.4% 10.9% 7.6% 9.8% 10.1% 4.7%
c 1.7% 6.3%
b -1.1%
Practices of competitors in the informal economy 9.7% 7.9% 8.5% 9.4% 7.7% 9.3% 8.9% 0.4% -1.8% -0.3% -0.1%
Uneducated Workforce 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 2.3% 3.4% 5.8% 2.8% 2.0%
c 0.0% 1.5% 3.6%
Political instability 2.8% 2.2% 2.9% 4.5% 6.7% 5.3% 5.0% 2.1% -0.5% 1.7% 0.8%
Customs and Trade Regulations 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 2.0% 2.5% 4.8% 2.3% 0.7% 0.1% 0.5% 2.7%
c
Transportation 6.3% 6.4% 6.5% 3.5% 4.2% 3.8% 3.8% -2.7%
c 0.1% -2.8% 0.3%
Crime 3.4% 4.8% 4.9% 4.7% 4.3% 3.8% 4.6% -0.3% 1.3% 1.3% -0.9%
Corruption 1.8% 2.3% 2.0% 4.1% 4.9% 3.0% 4.4% 2.4%
b 0.5% 2.3%
b -1.2%
Tax Administration 1.4% 1.6% 1.4% 1.7% 2.4% 2.8% 2.1% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 1.1%
Legal System 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 1.4% 0.8% 0.6%
a 0.2% 0.4%
b 1.0%
Business licensing and permits 3.8% 2.6% 2.8% 2.5% 2.4% 1.2% 2.3% -0.4% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2%
Labor Regulations 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.5% 1.2% 1.1% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3%
c 0.5%
b 0.6%











Table 11.  Obstacles to Doing Business in the Informal and Micro Survey Samples
Micro Survey Enterprise Survey DifferencesBurkina Faso Cape Verde Mauritius Madagascar Nepal Average
Better access to financing 63% 70% 72% 67% 64% 67%
Better access to raw materials 27% 32% 46% 25% 6% 27%
Better access to markets 13% 14% 17% 14% 4% 12%
Less bribes to pay 26% 15% 2% 16% 0% 12%
Better opportunities with formal firms 5% 10% 15% 3% 10% 9%
More access to government programs or services 8% 1% 9% 9% 12% 8%
Better legal foundations on the property 3% 3% 6% 10% 4% 5%
Better access to infrastructure service 2% 0% 4% 6% 0% 2%
Table 12: Costs and benefits of registering
Panel A:  Percentage of Informal Survey respondents rating the following as either the most important or second most important benefit that their firm could obtain from 
registeringAngola Burundi Botswana Ivory Coast Gambia Guinea Bissau Guinea Madagascar Mauritius Namibia Rowanda Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Average
Bribes that registered firms need to pay
. . . 85% . . . 20% . . . . . . 52%
Financial burden of taxes  12% 28% 12% 79% 27% 34% 55% 46% 19% 15% 30% 20% 37% 60% 34%
Financial cost of completing registration
22% 28% 13% 70% 24% 40% 42% 30% 14% 26% 4% 22% 28% 48% 29%
Administrative burden complying with 
taxes 17% 20% 7% 63% 14% 43% 43% 37% 23% 8% 9% 12% 31% 35% 26%
Minimum capital requirements 26% 20% 8% 48% 13% 32% 19% 25% 18% 25% 29% 25% 26% 38% 25%
Other administrative burdens 16% 17% 11% 76% 10% 35% 34% 27% 16% 7% 2% 9% 20% 23% 22%
Time to complete registration 28% 12% 15% 63% 9% 13% 25% 20% 11% 18% 3% 18% 11% 31% 20%
Difficulty of getting information 14% 1% 14% 58% 12% 17% 30% 19% 10% 22% 5% 14% 9% 23% 18%
Labor market rules 4% 18% 9% 48% 6% 23% 41% 9% 23% 3% 1% 20% 9% 7% 16%
Panel B:  Percentage of Micro Survey respondents that indicate that the following present either a "major obstacle" or a "very serious obstacle" with respect to registering a business
Table 12: Costs and benefits of registering (continued)